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Abstract: Tax evasion, which is typically considered an illegal activity, is a critical problem and is
considered a barrier to economic growth. A review of the literature shows that tax and social security
contributions, regulations, public sector services, the quality of institutions and tax compliance,
play important roles in determining the degree to which firms attempt to evade taxes. Measuring
tax evasion is problematic due to data requirements and inadequacies. Few tax evasion indices
have been estimated but it appears that they cannot be used for international comparisons across
countries. This important issue has largely been ignored in the literature, in particular for emerging
markets. Consequently, this paper is conducted to develop a new tax evasion index (TEI) using the
most substantial and recent data from the standardized World Bank Enterprises Survey 2006–2017.
In addition, using the newly developed TEI, the paper examines the importance and contribution
of information sharing and bank penetration to the degree of tax evasion in emerging markets.
The paper uses a sample of 112 emerging markets from 2006–2017 and the Tobit model in estimation.
The empirical findings from the paper indicate that the average TEI during the 2006–2017 period for
emerging markets is 0.62, with a range of (0.25, 0.75). In addition, we find that information sharing
and bank penetration negatively affect the degree of tax evasion, as proxied by the TEI, in emerging
markets. The empirical results also confirm the view that large firms are considered to have adopted
good tax compliance practices, while firms located in remote areas are more likely to evade taxes.
Policy implications have emerged on the basis of the empirical findings from the paper.
Keywords: tax evasion; information sharing; bank penetration; firms’ size; firms’ location;
emerging markets
JEL Classification: E26; G14; H26
1. Introduction
In emerging markets, tax evasion is a critical problem and is generally considered barriers to
economic growth. Existing studies have focused significantly on the linkages between financial
development and formal economic activities. This financial development-economic growth nexus has
attracted substantial attention in the literature on economic and financial development. However,
to date, a limited number of studies on the effects of financial intermediary developments including
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information sharing and bank penetration on the unofficial economic activity or the shadow economy,
have been conducted (Rizzi 2017; Ly and Vo 2014). Examining this economic and financial relationship
is essential as the shadow economy is a substantial problem in emerging markets.
Johnson et al. (1998) and Friedman et al. (2000) estimated the total contribution of shadow
economic activities to GDP to range from 10 to 15 per cent in developed countries and from 19 to 46 per
cent in emerging markets. Moreover, the shadow economy can negatively affect economic growth in
two main directions. First, it constrains investment opportunities as illegal firms may only operate in
an underground environment, which does not provide necessary market-support. Second, the shadow
economy leads to tax evasion, which reduces government tax revenues.
As a result of the shadow economy, tax evasion is typically taken to be an illegal activity that is
intended to hide taxable income from tax authorities and/or to claim fraudulent expenses in order to
reduce tax liabilities. By reporting a smaller income, higher expenses or, in extreme cases, no income at
all, firms are able to evade tax. Such enterprises are then faced with the possibility of being caught
cheating, so that a monetary fine can be imposed, in addition to payment of the previously evaded tax.
One of the primary reasons for tax evasion arises through information asymmetry because most
tax authorities in emerging markets do not have sufficient information to capture illegal activities that
are intended to reduce tax liabilities. Financial development, such as information sharing and bank
penetration which accelerates information processing and promotes transparent markets, are believed
to be capable of controlling the level of tax evasion.
Better information sharing and bank penetration are among the targets of financial intermediary
development. Together with other financial factors, including macroeconomic factors, their role is to
help: (a) formal banks to increase their loan security by avoiding information asymmetry between
loan owners and loan takers; and (b) firms that operate legally in the economy to receive economic
benefits. The major factors have been discussed and confirmed in several previous studies, including
Love and Mylenko (2003); Beck et al. (2011); Beck et al. (2014); and Vo et al. (2015).
Financial developments, including information sharing and bank penetration, could assist tax
evasion relief from various perspectives. Straub (2005) and Beck et al. (2007) suggested that improved
access to formal credit services helps increase formal operating firm benefits, which would assist in
reducing tax evasion. Moreover, information sharing leads to lower transaction costs and improves
credit efficiency by enhancing credit availability (Brown et al. 2009) and reduces bank corruption in
lending (Barth et al. 2009; Pham and Vo 2014). Such empirical evidence boosts the benefits to formal
firms, thereby lowering the motivation to evade tax of the informal group.
Moreover, tax evasion could appear under the label of “cooking the books.” In financial systems
where information sharing and bank penetration are well established, firms that misreport their
revenues would face greater obstacles in borrowing. Official banks and other financial intermediary
institutions would prefer appropriate functioning firms because of lower risks due to lower information
asymmetry. They would then be less likely to allocate financial resources to misreporting firms.
As such, the opportunity costs of evading tax would be higher in emerging markets that have enhanced
information sharing and high levels of bank penetration (Beck et al. 2014; Tran and Vo 2018).
In April 2016, a huge leak of confidential documents regarding taxes, known as the “Panama
Papers,” revealed significant information about how the rich are able to hide their assets to evade tax
under a particular Panamanian law firm by the name of Mossack Fonseca. The consequences spread
rapidly around the world, thereby creating a global scandal. This financial shock also raised the serious
issue as to how governments really manage and control tax evasion. Emerging markets do not have
advanced tax systems with high tax revenues and significant tax coverage. The lack of tax revenues is
a major problem as many governments in emerging markets could be deeply in debt, while they are
simultaneously seeking to finance national expenditures at all government levels.
A review of the literature shows that tax and social security contributions, regulations, public
sector services, the quality of institutions and tax compliance play important unidirectional roles in
determining whether firms attempt to evade government taxes. In addition, one of the most significant
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data sources, the standardized data set of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, does not appear to have
been analyzed comprehensively. The contents and structure of the surveys have changed over time,
which also lead to missing variables and observations. These issues emphasize the need to investigate
alternative measurements of tax evasion that do not suffer from the deficiencies of existing measures
and methods. This paper is one of the first of its kind in the literature to attempt this task.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Following this Introduction, Section 2 provides a
literature review on tax evasion approaches, information sharing and bank penetration on tax evasion.
Constructing the new tax evasion index, including the required data and the final estimates of degree
of tax evasion across emerging markets, are discussed and presented in Section 3. Section 4 examines
the importance and contribution of information sharing and bank penetration on tax evasion. The
section is then extended with the focus on firms size and location. Some concluding remarks and
policy implications are discussed in Section 5.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Tax Evasion Approaches
Numerous attempts have been conducted to verify the validity of the classic tax evasion model
of Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Much of the research has concentrated on two parameters that
represent enforcement intensity, namely the audit rate and tax rate. However, existing empirical
results have failed to establish a viable method to measure the level of tax non-compliance. The extant
literature has provided three main approaches to measure tax evasion in emerging markets (for further
details, Schneider and Enste 2000), which can be summarized as follows.
First, direct approaches include voluntary surveys, tax auditing and other compliance methods.
For example, the U.S. Internal Revenue Services (IRS) implemented a detail audit program from 1965
to 1988 on a stratified random sample of nearly 50,000 individual tax returns every 3 years to detect the
tax gap. The result of the audit is used to generate the actual income of an individual. A comparison
with reported income from that person presents the tax gap. This measure could be considered as a
proxy for tax evasion.
The advantage of the direct approach is the detailed information that can be elicited from replies.
However, dishonest answers are considered to be the primary disadvantage of the approach. Data can
be distorted or biased depending on the attitudes and willingness of respondents to answer correctly
because most of them are hesitant to reveal sensitive information. The quality of this method also
depends on how the questionnaire is constructed and implemented.
Second, the indirect approaches, known as indicator approaches, primarily use macroeconomic
and other indicators to estimate the growth in tax evasion over time. They examine traces of tax
evasion in measurable indicators. Some indicators that have been used to measure unofficial sectors
include differences in measurement between the expenditure and income approaches of gross national
product (GNP); discrepancies between the official and actual labor force and differences over time
between the volume of transactions and official GNP. Another approach is to check transactions that
use money, under the assumption that the true level of economic activity could be fully described by a
relationship between money and the velocity.
In comparing the estimated level of economic activity and official national accounts, it is possible
to determine the “shadow economy,” which could be used as a proxy to measure tax evasion. Although
all indirect methods could be used to measure tax evasion, with data available from many sources
for extended periods, each method has limitations and may not be applicable in each and every case
(for further details, see Schneider and Enste (2000)). One of the most important reasons is that all
indirect methods use only one indicator to represent the effects of the shadow economy and/or tax
evasion. Moreover, some monetary approaches consider only the tax burden as the cause of tax evasion.
However, the shadow economy and tax evasion have been established for many reasons and are
responsible for many impacts in production, labor and money markets.
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Third, model approaches were introduced by Frey and Weck (1983a, 1983b) and Frey and Weck
(1984) when 24 OECD countries were examined to determine the size of the shadow economy. Based on
statistical theory, the shadow economy or tax evasion are considered to be unobserved latent variables
and could be estimated using a cause-and-effect model, which would be measurable. The Dynamic
Multiple Indicators–Multiple Causes (or DYMIMIC) approach seems to fully explain the meaning
of the model approach and can be used to demonstrate the advantages of flexibility and precision,
among others.
2.2. Information Sharing and Bank Penetration on Tax Evasion
Information sharing in financial development indicates the exchange of data between financial
organizations with the focuses primarily on credit information. Bank penetration refers to physical
outreach by banks and lending institutions. Market transparency and the availability of credit are
represented by these two indicators that contribute to financial development. These indicators are
associated with the mitigation of tax evasion. There are a number of cases where firms deny their legal
corporate tax duties or evade tax. Beck et al. (2014) divide such cases into two main groups:
(i) The first group of firms gains illegal benefits because they are operating in the under-developed
emerging markets. As such, they may choose to hide their outputs because the systems
cannot detect the activities. This group achieves no tax burden but faces an unsupportive
business environment, as well as the possible imposition of tax penalties by governments in
emerging markets.
(ii) The second group of firms chooses to be formal but reduces their tax obligations by “cooking
the books.” Such firms are more difficult to be caught, as incorrect information in their financial
statements and general ledgers are not easy to be discovered. Consequently, the decisions from
such firms are illegal and the firms face potential punishment.
Theoretical and empirical evidence has been presented to examine the impacts of information
sharing and bank penetration on the corporate tax evasion level. Based on financial constraints,
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) suggested that a rational individual decides to pay or not pay tax due
to the consideration of maximizing the utility. Johnson et al. (2000) noted motivation of firms to hide
their incomes in emerging markets because they are unable to exploit the advantages when they are
operating in the formal economic sector.
Straub (2005) and Beck et al. (2007) suggested that improving access to formal credit services helps
increase the benefits to firms operating in the formal environment. Moreover, information sharing
can lead to lower transaction costs and improved credit efficiency by enhancing credit availability
(Brown et al. 2009) and reducing bank corruption in lending (Barth et al. 2009). Such evidence boosts
the benefits to firms operating in the formal group, thereby lowering any incentives to evade taxes
from firms operating in the informal group.
Hidden revenues by “cooking the books” can also be reduced by improving information sharing
and bank penetration. Tax evasion using this method causes uncertainty in the financial reports
prepared by firms. Consequently, doing so will raise the costs of banks in double checking to avoid
potential risks. The additional costs are usually transferred to borrowers as they subsequently face
higher interest rates and stricter loan conditions (Graham et al. 2008). In financial systems where
information sharing and bank penetration are well established, firms that misreport their revenues are
likely to face greater obstacles in borrowing funds.
Formal banks and other financial intermediary institutions prefer doing business with firms
operating in the formal sector because of lower risks associated with lower information asymmetry.
Consequently, they will be less likely to allocate resources to firms with the history of misreporting
revenue or costs. As such, the opportunity costs of tax evasion are higher in emerging markets with
enhanced information sharing and high levels of bank penetration (Beck et al. 2014). There are also
offsetting effects. Tax evading firms do not report hidden resources in their lists of financial assets.
Risks 2020, 8, 38 5 of 16
However, as firms need to demonstrate collaterals for borrowings, such firms that engage in tax evasion
have fewer opportunities to present collaterals for their intended loans.
As a result, stricter lending conditions and higher interest rates could be applied by banks for the
borrowing because banks consider riskier to provide loans to firms without good assets which can be
used as the collaterals for the borrowings. In the emerging markets with high levels of information
sharing and bank penetration, the importance of collaterals is relatively low as lenders can now monitor
borrowers because of lower information asymmetry (Beck et al. 2011; Gellard et al. 2013). Firms may
benefit when lower collateral is required in order to obtain loans. In short, tax evasion worsens the
opportunities for firms in such emerging markets.
Previous empirical studies have emphasized the roles of firm size and location for the tax evasion
problem. Beck et al. (2005) found that small firms are more sensitive to the depth of the financial
sector in comparison with larger firms. The same pattern arises for firms in smaller cities and towns.
Houston et al. (2010) observed that access to formal finance will benefit the group of small firms, as
well as firms that depend on external finance and exhibit high growth opportunities, in comparison
with larger firms. The authors suggested that information sharing and bank penetration may have
different impacts on different groups of firms, according to their size and location. In conclusion,
firms with smaller size, externally financial dependence and potentially high growth react strongly to
changes in the financial factors in comparison with firms of another opposite groups.
3. Constructing the Tax Evasion Index
3.1. Methodology and Data
The Ministry of Finance of Ministry of Finance of Bulgaria (2016) mentioned tax evasion as a
critical factor through which the shadow economy can be measured. The shadow economy itself
establishes the environment in which the informal sector failed to follow tax regulations and correctly
report their performances to the authorities. Operating in this environment helps firms to adopt
illegal activities including reporting lower revenues to the authorities, false bookkeeping or the sale of
undervalued real estate assets.
Legal operations with false bookkeeping and reporting; and illegal firms, which are the two
main components of tax evasion, are included in this index. Ela (2013) supported this argument by
describing the relationship between the shadow economy and tax evasion as a “feed and strengthen”
interaction. Heavy tax burdens increase the tendency for firms to operate in the informal sector.
Schneider and Enste (2000) and Schneider and Buehn (2013), among others, concluded the
following six main issues to have an impact on the shadow economy and tax evasion. On this paper,
this paper utilizes these issues and combines them into the following five factors which all together
lead to the tax evasion index: (i) tax and social security contribution burdens; (ii) regulations; (iii)
public sector services; (iv) quality of institutions; and (v) tax compliance.
The World Bank Enterprises Survey satisfies the requirements of variables for the two following
reasons. First, the survey is designed for face-to-face interviews with managers, especially managing
directors, of companies. Alternative interviewees are head of human resources and accountants, both
of whom are directly or indirectly related to the decision-making process with the directors of firms on
tax issues and other major business problems.
Second, the question is determined based on a 4-level scale, including: (i) No obstacles; (ii) Minor
obstacles; (iii) Major obstacles; and (iv) Very severe obstacles. In analyzing the data, we removed
responses that were not within this scale, for an example, with responses such as “Don’t know” and
“Does not apply.”
We now turn our attention to link each of the five factors included in our tax evasion index into
relevant questions obtained from the World Bank Enterprises Survey:
(a) Tax and social security could be represented in assessing the tax rates (Question j30a). The attitude
on the tax rates, in general, shows whether a firm is trying to balance the costs and benefits in
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paying tax. If the taxes are excessively high when the business environment is underdeveloped,
tax evasion is likely to occur.
(b) With respect to regulations, obtaining business licenses and permits (Question j30c) is always
the beginning of any obstacles faced by firms. Consequently, firms’ managers tend to hide their
incomes to avoid paying appropriate taxes. This variable appears to be appropriate as a proxy for
firms in assessing regulations.
(c) Electricity is one of the major goods which is an important input to the operations of firms. In the
emerging markets, governments often take control of electricity production, transmission and
distribution of energy to firms and households. Electricity also plays a significant role in firms’
operations. Facing obstacles in accessing electricity causes a significant reduction in firms’ benefits
and as such and encourages a tendency to avoid taxes. As such, we consider that obstacles to
obtaining electricity (Question c30a) would be able to represent the public sector services.
(d) When discussing the quality of institutions, political instability is used as an appropriate measure
(Question j30e). A high level of political instability causes risk and uncertainty in the business
environment and reduces a government’s ability to manage the economy, including tax collection.
Such risks and uncertainty faced by firms would make them more likely to hide their profits to
avoid the payment of taxes.
(e) Obstacles in corruption (Question j30f) are used as a proxy for tax compliance. High level of
corruption in an emerging market is the signal that indicates bad economic governance, thereby
creating opportunities for firms to evade tax. Using data for the ASEAN countries, Vo et al. (2015)
concluded the positive impacts of corruption on the shadow economy. The authors also considered
that the effect of corruption to the shadow economy is at a higher degree in comparison with the
effect from shadow economy to corruption.
The new TEI in this paper is constructed, as in Table 1 below, by calculating an equally weighted
average (mean) of the above five indicators which represent the five main sources of effects to tax
evasion by firms.
Table 1. Data for a construction of the tax evasion index.
Variables Definition/Calculation Sources Level
Problem with Tax and
social security contribution
burdens
Question j30a: Assessment of tax rates as No
Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Major Obstacle or a
Very Severe Obstacle to the current operations of this
establishment.
World Bank Private
Enterprise Survey Firm
Problem with regulations
Question j30c: Assessment of business licensing and
permits as No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Major
Obstacle or a Very Severe Obstacle to the current
operations of this establishment.
World Bank Private
Enterprise Survey Firm
Problem with public sector
services
Question c30a: Assessment of electricity as No
Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Major Obstacle or a
Very Severe Obstacle to the current operations of this
establishment.
World Bank Private
Enterprise Survey Firm
Problem with quality of
institutions
Question J30e: Assessment of political instability as
No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Major Obstacle or a
Very Severe Obstacle to the current operations of this
establishment.
World Bank Private
Enterprise Survey Firm
Problem with tax
compliance
Question j30f: Assessment of corruption as No
Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Major Obstacle or a
Very Severe Obstacle to the current operations of this
establishment.
World Bank Private
Enterprise Survey Firm
Tax evasion index (TEI) Combining five above factors in an equally average:sum answers of five questions/ maximum points. Authors’ calculations Firm
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3.2. A Tax Evasion Index across Emerging and Developing Countries
Once the five key components of the tax evasion index have been identified as previously discussed,
without prior perception of the importance of each factor, we consider that equally weighted average
of these components appear to be appropriate. On this basis, the tax evasion index across developing
and emerging markets is presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Tax Evasion Index (TEI) across emerging market, 2006–2017 period.
No. Country TEI(mean) No. Country
TEI
(mean) No. Country
TEI
(mean)
1 Afghanistan 0.7109 39 Georgia 0.6841 77 Nigeria 0.5511
2 Albania 0.6337 40 Ghana 0.5689 78 Pakistan 0.6789
3 Angola 0.6808 41 Grenada 0.5091 79 Panama 0.5064
4 Armenia 0.6176 42 Guatemala 0.6467 80 Paraguay 0.6101
5 Azerbaijan 0.5700 43 Guinea 0.6724 81 Peru 0.6058
6 Bangladesh 0.6188 44 GuineaBissau 0.6627 82 Philippines 0.5154
7 Belarus 0.6253 45 Guyana 0.6246 83 Romania 0.6820
8 Belize 0.5743 46 Honduras 0.6128 84 Rwanda 0.6244
9 Benin 0.6689 47 India 0.5753 85 Samoa 0.5309
10 Bhutan 0.5182 48 Indonesia 0.5429 86 Senegal 0.5397
11 Bolivia 0.6392 49 Iraq 0.7432 87 Serbia 0.5809
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.6302 50 Jamaica 0.6034 88 SierraLeone 0.5738
13 Botswana 0.5386 51 Jordan 0.5408 89 SouthAfrica 0.5441
14 Brazil 0.7539 52 Kazakhstan 0.6255 90 SouthSudan 0.6472
15 Bulgaria 0.5949 53 Kenya 0.5743 91 Sri Lanka 0.5372
16 Burkina Faso 0.6685 54 Kosovo 0.6324 92 St. Lucia 0.6306
17 Burundi 0.6320 55 KyrgyzRepublic 0.6717 93
St.
Vincent
and
Grenadines
0.5154
18 Cameroon 0.6377 56 Lao PDR 0.3750 94 Sudan 0.6337
19 Cape Verde 0.6141 57 Lebanon 0.6972 95 Suriname 0.5724
20 Central African Republic 0.6408 58 Lesotho 0.5990 96 Swaziland 0.6185
21 Chad 0.7080 59 Liberia 0.6372 97 Tajikistan 0.7218
22 China 0.3315 60 Madagascar 0.6297 98 Tanzania 0.6486
23 Colombia 0.6093 61 Malawi 0.5505 99 TimorLeste 0.7333
24 Congo Republic 0.7285 62 Mali 0.5601 100 Togo 0.7128
25 Costa Rica 0.6339 63 Mauritania 0.6044 101 Tonga 0.4720
26 Côte d’Ivoire 0.7043 64 Mauritius 0.6556 102 Tunisia 0.5769
27 Djibouti 0.6011 65 Mexico 0.6571 103 Turkey 0.6178
28 Dominica 0.3700 66 Micronesia 0.5167 104 Uganda 0.5672
29 Dominican Republic 0.6413 67 Moldova 0.6900 105 Ukraine 0.6922
30 DR Congo 0.6552 68 Mongolia 0.5645 106 Uzbekistan 0.5691
31 Ecuador 0.6496 69 Montenegro 0.5056 107 Vanuatu 0.5693
32 Egypt 0.6687 70 Morocco 0.6572 108 Vietnam 0.4479
33 El Salvador 0.6365 71 Mozambique 0.5527 109
West
Bank and
Gaza
0.6657
34 Eritrea 0.2500 72 Myanmar 0.5500 110 Yemen 0.7262
35 Ethiopia 0.5161 73 Namibia 0.5136 111 Zambia 0.5135
36 Fiji 0.5875 74 Nepal 0.6576 112 Zimbabwe 0.5816
37 Gabon 0.5250 75 Nicaragua 0.6500
38 Gambia 0.6875 76 Niger 0.7128
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Table 2 shows that the average tax evasion index (TEI) for emerging markets is 0.62 and that it
varies within a range (0.25, 0.75). Vietnam has a TEI of 0.4479, which is considered to be relatively high
compared with other emerging countries in the sample.
4. Effects of Information Sharing and Bank Penetration on Tax Evasion in Emerging Markets
4.1. Methodology
In order to measure the effects of financial developments on tax evasion, we begin with the simple
model of Beck et al. (2014). The model represents the financial development factors as descriptive
variables to explain unidirectional tax evasion, together with appropriate control variables at both the
firm and market levels:
Ti jk = αFi + βCi + γB j + θk + εi jk (1)
where Ti jk represents the tax evasion ratio for emerging market i, firm j and industry k; Fi is the vector
of financial sector indicators, including information sharing and branch penetration variables; Ci and B j
are groups of control variables1 for the emerging market and firm levels, respectively; θk is a group of
15 industry dummies; and εi jk represents the random error terms for i, j and k. The model specification
is intended to avoid the possible problem of endogeneity that can arise in panel data studies.
The inclusion of industry dummies is both reasonable and necessary. Due to the differences in
the business environment and law, different industries would be expected to exhibit different tax
evasion patterns. The dummy variables allow to separate analyses between the industries. The lists of
industries, variables in relation to tax evasion, the financial sector and location and firm size, all of
which relate to the questions that were discussed above, as well as control variables, are presented in
Tables 3–5 below. The yearly dummies are used to control the within-market differences caused by
global trends. Because the tax evasion index (TEI) is a ratio, a positive fraction, the Tobit regression
approach with a lower limit of 0 and an upper limit of 1 will be used for the empirical analysis.
Table 3. Financial sector.
Variables Definition/Calculation Sources Level
Information sharing
The dummy variable equals 1 if an information
sharing agency (public credit registry or private
credit bureau) operates in the country (or
emerging market), zero otherwise.
World Bank
“Doing Business”
data base
Country
Depth of information
sharing
“Depth of credit information sharing” indicator,
range from 0–6
World Bank
“Doing Business”
data base
Country
Demographic bank
penetration
Number of commercial bank branches per
100.000 adults (coded FB. CBK. BRCH. P5 from
the World Banks Indicator database)
World Bank World
Development
Indicators
Country
Geographic bank
penetration
Number of commercial bank branches per
10.000 square km–calculated by: (demographic
bank penetration * total population/100,000) *
10,000/total area
World Bank World
Development
Indicators
Country
1 Capital flows may be an important control variable for future studies (for details, see Feldstein (1994); Fratzscher (2012); and
Marfatia (2016)).
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Table 4. Location and firm size.
Variables Definition/Calculation Sources Level
Small city
Question a3: To be equal 1 if a city has fewer than
250,000 residents in population (including category 4
and 5 of the answer), otherwise 0.
World Bank Private
Enterprise Survey Firm
Capital city Question a3: To be equal 1 if a city is a capital city(including category 1 of the answer), otherwise 0.
World Bank Private
Enterprise Survey Firm
Small firm Question a6: Size, firms are categorized by number ofemployees. Small firms have from 5 to 19 employees.
World Bank Private
Enterprise Survey Firm
Large firm Question a6: Size, firms are categorized by numberof employees. Large firms have over 100 employees.
World Bank Private
Enterprise Survey Firm
Table 5. Control variables.
Variables Definition/Calculation Sources Level
Log of GDP per capita A natural log of GDP per capita.
World Bank World
Development
Indicators
Country
Log of firm age Question b5: In what year did this establishment beginoperations in this country (or emerging market)?
World Bank Private
Enterprise Survey Firm
Log of manager’s
experience level
Question b7: How many years of experience working in
this sector does the top manager have?
World Bank Private
Enterprise Survey Firm
In this paper, an emphasis is based on marginal effects rather than on coefficients in order to assess
the economic influences. Robust Newey-West HAC standard errors are reported to avoid potential
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. In order to assess the impacts of firm size and location on the
relationship between tax evasion and financial development variables, interaction terms are included
in the non-nested Equations (2) and (3), as follows:
Ti jk = αFi + τ1Fi × Size j + βCi + γB j + θk + εi jk (2)
Ti jk = αFi + τ2Fi × Location j + βCi + γB j + θk + εi jk (3)
where: Size j is the vector of firm j’s size, including small firm and large firm dummies, as compared
with mid-size firms; and Location j is the vector of firm j’s location, including capital city and small city
dummies, as compared with mid-sized cities.2
4.2. Data
The standardized data from the World Bank Enterprises Survey from 2006–2017 is used in the
empirical analysis. Emerging markets are selected based on the definition of the World Bank to provide
a data set of 112 emerging markets, with more than 29 thousand observations worldwide. Information
sharing variables are retrieved from the World Bank Doing Business data base, while bank penetration
variables are collected from the World Bank Development Indicators data. Data for other variables
have been collected and summarized from the three different sources as mentioned above.
The definition of emerging markets by the World Bank means countries that are classified as
low- or middle-income. Low-income countries have income per capita lower than or equal to $1045.
Middle-income countries consist of two sub-groups which are lower-middle-income (income per
capita from $1046 to $4125) and upper-middle-income (income per capita from $4126 to $12,735).
2 Different methods can be considered in the future (for details, see Cekin et al. (2019); Marfatia et al. (2017); and Okunade
and Karakus (2001)).
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For Information sharing, two methods of measurement are adopted, both of which are from the World
Bank Doing Business data. Specifically, since 2013, the Doing Business data base has changed the
underlying method and added two features, making depth of information sharing index range from 0
to 8. However, in order to allow comparisons over time, in this paper, we use the former index that
ranges from 0 to 6.
A more detailed indicator for information sharing which ranges from zero to six, depending on a
number of characteristics that a financial system in an emerging market has from a set of the following
six features:
(i) both positive and negative credit information are distributed;
(ii) data on both firms and individual borrowers are distributed;
(iii) data from retailers, trade creditors or utilities, as well as from financial institutions, are distributed;
(iv) more than two years of historical data are distributed;
(v) data are collected on all loans in value above 1 per cent of income per capita; and
(vi) laws provide borrowers the right to inspect their own data. A higher value of the second
measurement represents a deeper information sharing status, as well as a more transparent
credit environment.
For bank penetration, the paper uses two measures, namely “geographic bank penetration” and
“demographic bank penetration,” both of which originate from the World Bank World Development
Indicators data. The demographic bank penetration, which describes the number of commercial bank
branches per 100.000 adults, is collected from the data:
Geographic bank penetration =
(demographic bank penetration×total population)
100,000 × 10,000total area
The meaning of the above estimated penetration measure represents the number of commercial
bank branches per 10,000 square kilometers for geographic bank penetration. On the right-hand
side of the equation, the first fraction illustrates the total number of commercial bank branches in
an emerging market, while the second fraction modifies the measure to reflect a “per 10,000 square
kilometers” indicator.
The paper also includes the size of enterprises, the firm locations to be sub indicators, to
accommodate the second hypothesis and answer the second research question. “Firm size” covers
two categories, namely small firm sizes and large firm sizes. Two different dummy variables are used
in which the small-sized firm variable is proxied as 1 if a firm has from 5 to 19 employees, while the
large-sized firm variable considers firms over 100 employees. “Firm’s location” indicators also include
capital, which refers to firms located in a capital city and small city, which consists of firms in cities
with fewer than 250,000 residents in the population.
The middle-sized firms and cities are the omitted categories. In addition, we add “firm age,” for
which the natural logarithms of total operating years of a firm until 2017 and the natural logarithm of
“GDP per capita” to cover the “experience level of top managers.” In order to control the economic
trend over time, the paper uses yearly dummies. Tables 3–5 summarize all the variables together with
their definitions and data sources.
4.3. Empirical Results and Discussions
4.3.1. Effects of Information Sharing and Bank Penetration on Tax Evasion
A set of five regressions is conducted to respond to the first research question, which is: “Do
higher information sharing level and wider bank penetration help to reduce tax evasion in emerging
markets?”
The Tobit regression results in Table 6 examine the effects of information sharing and bank
penetration on tax evasion. Findings from Table 6 indicate that information sharing, including “depth
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of info sharing” and “info sharing,” significantly and negatively affect tax evasion from firms in
emerging markets. Based on the marginal effects, the existence of a public or private credit bureau and
a deep level of information sharing will reduce the probability of tax evasion by firms, regardless of
the firm size and location.
Table 6. Effects of information sharing and bank penetration on tax evasion.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Tobit Regressions
Depth of info sharing −0.00248 *** - - - −0.00316 ***
(0.000471) - - - (0.000492)
Info sharing −0.0363 *** - - -
- (0.00307) - - -
Demographic bank penetration - - −0.000247 *** - -
- - (7.55 × 10−5) - -
Geographic bank penetration - - - −1.63 × 10−5 *** −1.18 × 10−5 **
- - - (4.00 × 10−6) (5.77 × 10−6)
Small city −0.0119 *** −0.00725 *** −0.00441 −0.00452 −0.0101 ***
(0.00286) (0.00269) (0.00272) (0.00279) (0.00308)
Capital city 0.0196 *** 0.0239 *** 0.0261 *** 0.0248 *** 0.0204 ***
(0.00345) (0.00331) (0.00332) (0.00332) (0.00347)
Ln (GDP per capital) −0.00256 *** −0.00257 *** −0.00239 *** −0.00115 ** −0.000995 *
(0.000481) (0.000441) (0.000455) (0.000472) (0.000513)
Ln (Firm age) −0.00606 *** −0.000245 −0.00189 0.000108 −0.00396 ***
(0.00149) (0.00142) (0.00142) (0.00145) (0.00153)
Ln (Top manager’s experience) 0.00976 *** 0.0132 *** 0.0124 *** 0.0132 *** 0.0115 ***
(0.00153) (0.00139) (0.00140) (0.00141) (0.00158)
Observations 22,904 28,853 28,261 27,803 21,991
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
A higher level of information sharing indicates a more transparent financial environment. Business
owners have greater incentives as every mistake in attempting to evade taxes could lead to bad credit
positioning, which would negatively and severely affect the ability of obtaining lines of credit for firms
in the future.
The effects of bank penetration through “demographic bank penetration” and “geographic bank
penetration” on tax evasion are also statistically significant and negative at the 1 per cent level. This
study finds that a higher level of bank penetration will reduce tax evasion level by firms.
4.3.2. Firm Size and Location Influences
Table 7 examines the effects of firm size on the effect of information sharing and bank penetration
on tax evasion. The estimated coefficients show a consistent pattern across the three models. In general,
information sharing and bank penetration tend to provide higher effects on larger firms than on
medium-sized firms.
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Table 7. Information sharing and bank penetration on tax evasion with the focus on firm’s size.
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Tobit Regressions
Depth of info sharing −0.00223 ***
(0.000602)
Depth of info sharing x Small firm 0.000749
(0.000635)
Depth of info sharing x Large firm −0.00323 ***
(0.000823)
Demographic bank penetration −0.000175 *
(9.67 × 10−5)
Demographic bank penetration x Small firm 6.46 × 10−5
(0.000118)
Demographic bank penetration x Large firm −0.000439 ***
(0.000137)
Geographic bank −9.78 × 10−6 **
(4.87 × 10−6)
Geographic bank x Small firm −5.30 × 10−6
(6.51 × 10−6)
Geographic bank x Large firm −2.48 × 10−5 ***
(7.43 × 10−6)
Small city −0.0117 *** −0.00465 * −0.00438
(0.00286) (0.00272) (0.00279)
Capital city 0.0200 *** 0.0264 *** 0.0250 ***
(0.00345) (0.00332) (0.00332)
Ln (GDP per capita) −0.00257 *** −0.00241 *** −0.00114 **
(0.000480) (0.000454) (0.000472)
Ln (Firm age) −0.00529 *** −0.00143 0.000249
(0.00150) (0.00143) (0.00145)
Ln (Top manager’s experience) 0.00993 *** 0.0125 *** 0.0132 ***
(0.00153) (0.00140) (0.00142)
Observations 22,904 28,261 27,803
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
For similar reasons, a different relationship is expected for the effect of information sharing
and bank penetration on the degree of tax evasion across firms at different locations. The effects of
location on the relationship between financial development and tax evasion are presented in Table 8.
The empirical findings indicate that locating in small cities and towns seems to weaken the effect of
information sharing and bank penetration on the degree of tax evasion.
In small cities, there is a limited effect of information sharing and bank penetration on the tax
decisions of firms. The distance to the economic center may reduce the strength of regulations as it
can be difficult for tax officers to visit firms on a frequent basis. However, this effect is positive and
insignificant when demographic bank penetration is used. The results are not especially consistent
across the three regressions models but could still be described as an overall pattern. In summary,
information sharing and bank penetration are found to provide higher effects on tax evasion for large
firms and lower effects for firms that are located in small cities and towns.
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Table 8. Information sharing and bank penetration on tax evasion with the focus on firm’s location.
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Tobit Regressions
Depth of info sharing −0.00332 ***
(0.000618)
Depth of info sharing x Capital city 0.000749
(0.00118)
Depth of info sharing x Small city 0.00317 ***
(0.00111)
Demographic bank penetration −0.000240 **
(0.000115)
Demographic bank penetration x Capital
city 0.000210
(0.000172)
Demographic bank penetration x Small city −0.000236
(0.000175)
Geographic bank penetration −2.91 × 10−5 ***
(4.87 × 10−6)
Geographic bank penetration x Capital city 2.04 × 10−5
(1.46 × 10−5)
Geographic bank penetration x Small city 3.97 × 10−5 ***
(8.58 × 10−6)
Small city −0.0217 *** −0.000445 −0.0161 ***
(0.00441) (0.00365) (0.00388)
Capital city 0.0173 *** 0.0217 *** 0.0209 ***
(0.00525) (0.00432) (0.00384)
Ln(GDP per capita) −0.00254 *** −0.00233 *** −0.00140 ***
(0.000482) (0.000456) (0.000476)
Ln(Firm age) −0.00609 *** −0.00186 0.000241
(0.00149) (0.00142) (0.00145)
Ln(Top manager’s experience) 0.00972 *** 0.0124 *** 0.0130 ***
(0.00152) (0.00140) (0.00141)
Observations 22,904 28,261 27,803
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5%
levels, respectively.
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Tax evasion has been a major concern for developing and emerging markets for an extended period.
The issue has attracted great attention from policymakers, practitioners and academics. In addition,
the importance of information share and bank penetration has largely been ignored in the literature for
emerging markets. This paper is conducted to provide a comprehensive analysis of tax evasion in
emerging markets by exploring the following objectives.
A new tax evasion index (TEI) is developed using data from the standardized World Bank
Enterprises Survey 2006–2017. Doing so provides a basis for a comparison of different levels of tax
evasion across emerging markets. Second, the paper explores the importance of information sharing
and bank penetration on tax evasion in emerging markets. Third, the paper also investigates the above
relationship of information sharing and bank penetration on tax evasion when firm size and firm
location are taken into account.
The key findings of the paper can be summarized as follows:
(1) On the basis of the literature review, the influential factors to develop the new tax evasion index
(TEI) include: (i) tax and social security contribution burdens; (ii) regulations; (iii) public sector
services; (iv) quality of institutions; and (v) tax compliance using equal weights. The new TEI
presents a range of tax evasion degree from 0.25 to 0.7.539. Among these emerging markets,
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Brazil has the highest TEI of 0.7539, while Eritrea had the lowest TEI of 0.25. Corruption appears
to contribute substantially to the degree of tax evasion from firms in the emerging markets.
(2) A model developed by Beck et al. (2014) was used to investigate the contribution and importance
of information sharing and bank penetration on tax evasion which is proxied by the new TEI.
The empirical results showed that higher levels of information sharing and bank penetration
reduced tax evasion in emerging markets.
(3) The contribution and importance of information sharing and bank penetration on tax evasion
is reconsidered when we take firm size and location into consideration. The empirical results
indicated that larger firms were less likely to evade taxes in an environment with strong financial
development. Firms located in small regions appeared to evade taxes more often than in
medium-sized cities if there was a high level of information sharing or bank penetration.
In addition, the characteristics of locating in capital cities or small sizes did not have a
significant impact on the effect of information sharing and bank penetration on tax evasion in
emerging markets.
Policy implications have emerged on the grounds of these empirical findings. First, governments
from emerging markets should be aware of the degree of tax evasion in their countries, so that
appropriate policies can be implemented to minimize such occurrence. On this basis, the new tax
evasion index can provide a starting point for government considerations. In particular, the index
includes various factors which contribute to the degree of tax evasion in the country. The government
should take note of these key and fundamental factors. As an example, the paper finds that corruption
played an important role in tax evasion in emerging markets.
It was found that information sharing and bank penetration did contribute negatively to the
degree of tax evasion in emerging markets. As such, policies targeting information sharing and bank
penetration can help to reduce the degree of tax evasion. This empirical result supports the view that a
higher level of financial development should be promulgated as an effective method to restrict tax
evasion in emerging markets.
It appears that even if there is a high level of information sharing and bank penetration in emerging
markets, firms that are located in small cities appeared to evade taxes more often because physical
isolation was able to provide greater opportunities for tax evasion. As such, governments in emerging
markets should enable tax authorities to increase the number of staff in tax offices in small cities to
restrict tax evasion through more frequent random tax inspections.
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